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T he United States Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving
the definition of "security" as used in the federal securities acts. In
this brief case comment I will summarize the majority and dissenting
opinions in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, and Gould v. Ruefenacht .2
I will then comment on some of the policy questions raised by the cases,
and conclude by evaluating how much guidance the two cases provide on
the proper definition of "security".
I. SYNOPSIS OF THE CASES
The Landreth and R uefenacht cases both involved the so-called sale-of-
business doctrine. The question of the validity of the sale-of-business
doctrine had sharply divided both courts 3 and commentators. 4 The
* Professor, The University of Tulsa College of Law; A.B., M.A., Ohio University; J.D.,
The University of Michigan Law School.
1 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
2 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985).
' Compare Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Chandler v. Kew,
Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977); and King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982)(all
following sale-of-business doctrine) with Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d
227 (2nd Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); and Daily v Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983)(all rejecting
sale-of-business doctrine).
' Compare Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale ofBusiness"Doctrine Under
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doctrine essentially held that the purchase of all, or even a majority, of
the stock of a corporation with the intent to manage the business is not
a purchase of a security within the meaning of the federal securities laws.
The purchaser of the stock is essentially viewed as an enterpreneur and
not an investor; he or she is purchasing the assets of a business with the
purpose of managing those assets. The sale of stock is merely incidental
to that sale of assets. 5
The Supreme Court's decision in United Housing Foundation, Inc. U.
Forman6 has generated much of the controversy over the sale-of-business
doctrine. In that case the Court held that shares of stock in a nonprofit
housing cooperative were not securities. In the first portion of its decision,
the Court rejected the argument that the interest in the cooperative must
be considered a security since it was called "stock" and the statutory
definition of "security" includes the word "stock". 7 The Court spurned a
literal approach and held that the application of the securities laws
turned on the economic realities of a transaction and not on the label the
parties applied to it.8 The Court noted that the interest involved had none
of the characteristics commonly associated with stock. 9 In the second
portion of its decision, the Court, applying the Howey test,10 decided that
the shares also did not fall within the catch-all provision in the statutory
definition; the shares were not investment contracts."
Since Forman, courts and commentators have argued over whether the
case authorized application of the Howey test to corporate stock. Those
the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1982); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition
of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Securities
Transaction, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225 (1982); Note, Function Over Form: The Sale of Business
Doctrine and the Definition of "Security", 63 B.U.L. REV. 1129 (1983); Note, The Sale of
Business Doctrine: A Decade After Forman, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1325 (1983) and Comment,
Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchase of Corporate Stock: An Argument for Exclusion
from Federal Securities Regulation, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 295 (1980)(approving of sale-of-
business doctrine) with Black, Is Stock a Security? A Criticism of the Sale of Business
Doctrine in Securities Fraud Litigation, 16 U.C.D.L. REV. 325 (1983); Hazen, Taking Stock
of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations: When is Stock Not a Security? 61 N.C.L.
REV. 393 (1983); Karjala, Realigning Federal and State Roles in Securities Regulation
Through the Definition of a Security, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 413; and Prentice & Roszkowski,
The Sale of Business Doctrine: New Relief from Securities Regulation or a New Haven for
Welshers?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (1983)(all disapproving of the sale-of-business doctrine).
5 Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1982).
6 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
7 Id. at 848.
8 Id. at 849.
9 Id. at 851.
' The Howey test is derived from the Court's decision in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1946). Under this test "(the question is] whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with the profits to come solely from the efforts
of others." Id. at 301.
" 421 U.S. at 851-58.
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who believed it did could point to the Court's statement that "[wie reject
at the outset any suggestion that the present transaction, evidenced by
the sale of shares called 'stock', must be considered a security transaction
simply because the statutory definition of a security includes the words
Cany ... stock'.12 Thus, Forman was read as rejecting a literal approach
to the statutory definition.
Others argued that Forman applied a two part test. 13 The Court first
decided, in effect, that the interest involved was not really stock. Only
then did the Court apply the Howey test.
The Landreth case involved a purchase of all of the common stock of a
corporation; the Ruefenacht case involved a purchase of fifty percent of
the stock of a corporation under an arrangement in which the purchaser
and seller were to manage the business jointly. In both cases the issue
was the same: Was the stock involved a security within the meaning of
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws? In Landreth,4 the
Ninth Circuit, applying the sale-of-business doctrine, found that the
stock involved was not a security; in Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran,15 the
Third Circuit, rejecting the sale-of-business doctrine, held that the stock
involved was a security. The Supreme Court reversed in Landreth and
affirmed in Ruefenacht, with only Justice Stevens dissenting. The Court
clearly rejected the sale-of-business doctrine.
A. The Majority Opinions
The majority opinions in the two cases are interesting in a number of
respects. At one level, they are interesting for the answer provided for the
specific question before the Court. At another level, they are interesting
because of the policies that appear to have influenced the majority. For
the sake of convenience and clarity, the two cases will be discussed as one.
The thrust of the Court's decisions in the cases was that the Howey test
is not a universal test which all securities must meet. The Court began
with a reminder that "'[tihe starting point in every case involving the
construction of a statute is the language itself."'1 6 It then examined the
definition of "security" found in the Securities Act of 193317 and essen-
12 Id. at 848. See, e.g., Frederiksen v, Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
"3 See, e.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2nd Cir. 1981) (Forman applied a
two-part seriatim test); Karjala, supra note 4, at 419-20 (Court in Forman did not use Howey
test to decide if interests involved were stock).
14 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd 105 S.Ct. 2297 (1985).
'5 737 F.2d 320 (3rd Cir. 1984), affd sub. nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308
(1985).
,3 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2301, quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1975)(Powell, J., concurring).
17 Section 2(1) 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)(1982)). The Court
stated: "We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of'security' in §§ 3(a)(10) of the 1934
19861
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tially found a dichotomy in the definition between those instruments
listed whose name alone carried a well-settled meaning and those
instruments of a more variable character that were designated by the
more general catch-all terms "investment contract" and "instruments
commonly known as a 'security." '18 According to the Court, prior Su-
preme Court decisions that had looked beyond the form of a transaction
to its economic substance all involved instruments that were unusual, or
not easily categorized as securities. Thus, the Court stated that it had
never foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a security
merely because of what it purports to be.' 9 The Court noted that if the
Howey test were a general test which all securities must meet, then the
enumeration of specific types of instruments in the definitional section of
the statute would be superfluous to the catch-all phrases.20
The Court distinguished the Forman decision. It stated that it was not
enough that something is called stock for it to be a security; it must in fact
have the usual characteristics of stock.2 1 The Court recalled that in the
Forman case it had identified the usual characteristics of common stock
as "(i) the right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated;
(iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value."22 The interests or
instruments involved in the Forman case, although denominated by the
parties as stock, "bore none of the characteristics . . . that are usually
associated with traditional stock. '23 Thus, Forman did not really involve
stock. In both Landreth and Ruefenacht, by comparison, the Court noted
that the stock possessed all of the characteristics usually associated with
stock. 24 In sum, the Court agreed with those who had read Forman as
requiring a two part analysis.
The decisions are also noteworthy as a result of the Court's discussions
of the policies which supported its decisions. First, the Court rejected the
Act and §§ 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as such in our
decisions dealing with the scope of the term. (Citations omitted)." Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at
2302 n.1.
'8 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302.
'9 Id. at 2304. See also Forman, 421 U.S. at 850-51, where the Court stated:
we do not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether [an
instrument] is a security. There may be occasions when the use of a traditional
name such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that
the federal securities laws apply. This would clearly be the case when the
underlying transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typically
associated with the named instrument.
20 Id. at 2305.
21 Id. at 2302.
22 Id., referring to, 421 U.S. at 851.
23 105 S. Ct. at 2302.
24 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302-23; Gould, 105 S. Ct. at 2310.
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notion that entreprenuers ipso factor are not entitled to the protection of
the federal securities laws. The Court noted a number of provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 the purposes of which it believed would
be contravened if the term "security" were interpreted to exclude all
transactions in which control passed to the purchaser. 25 In addition, the
Court noted that while Congress had exempted nonpublic offerings from
the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, it had not
exempted such transactions from the antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties laws. 26 Thus, the Court implied that both the language and the
structure of the Acts supported its conclusion that traditional stock is a
security, even when purchased by a person intending to manage the
business. Though the sale might be exempt from the registration require-
ments, the antifraud provisions are fully applicable.
Second, the Court expressed concern about the need for predictability
in applying the federal securities laws. This concern appears to have had
two focuses. One was on the expectations of the parties involved in the
transaction. The Court stated in Landreth that "persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their activities are
governed by the Acts. '27 The Court indicated, however, that if the sale of
business doctrine were adopted, the question of control and, conse-
quently, applicability of the federal securities laws would potentially
depend upon multiple factors. Thus, "coverage by the Acts would in most
cases be unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock
was sold."28 A second focus was the effect on the federal court's caseload
of the creation of slippery factual questions. The Court expressed concern
over the "prospect that parties to a transaction may never know whether
they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended discovery and
litigation over a concept as often elusive as the passage of control." 29
Finally, the Court found very troubling the possibility that, if the
sale-of-business doctrine were adopted an instrument could be a security
as to one party and not another. The Court said that such a distinction
would be arbitrary because the applicability of the securities laws would
depend not on the type and character of the instrument involved. The
protective purposes of the Acts, according to the Court, would not be
served by such a distinction.30
2 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2305. The Court cited sections 14 and 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. sections 78n and 78p as examples.
26 105 S. Ct. at 2305.
27 Id. at 2306.
28 Id. at 2307.
29 Id. at 2308.
3' Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2311.
19861
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B. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens dissented on several points in both cases in identical
opinions. 3' First, he would not have treated the form of transaction as
decisive of the applicability of the securities laws. Justice Stevens
discussed notes, which are within the literal definition of a "security"
under both Acts, pointing out that the economic realities of even an
ordinary transaction should be considered in determining whether a
security exists and that notes should not always be considered securi-
ties.32 Justice Stevens would not find the form of a transaction determi-
native in situations such as the privately negotiated sale of control of a
business, since the form of the transaction in such a case is of concern
only to the parties to the transaction and "usually hinges on matters that
are irrelevant to the federal securities laws . . .,33
In addition, Justice Stevens took a different view of the policy consid-
erations involved in the cases. Justice Stevens viewed the regulation of
trading of securities in public markets as the congressional purpose
behind the federal securities laws. 34 Unlike the majority, he found that
Congress did not intend to protect investors in securities which are not
offered or sold in a public market if the investors have the ability to
protect themselves through negotiated contractual provisions. Thus,
Stevens would find the antifraud provisions inapplicable unless the
transaction involved "(i) the sale of a security that is traded in a public
market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a position to negotiate appropri-
ate contractual warranties and to insist on access to inside information
before consummating the transaction."35
Finally, Justice Stevens, while admitting that his approach was not the
"bright line" approach of the majority, questioned the expanded applica-
tion of the federal securities laws to cover substantive evils far afield from
the congressional concern with regulation of public markets. He weighted
this consideration more heavily than the interest in certainty and
predictability that moved the majority.36
II. THE POLICY QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE CASES
A. Are Entrepreneurs in the Protected Class?
An examination of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Landreth and Ruefenacht highlights some of the interesting policy ques-
31 105 S. Ct. 2312.
32 Id. at 2312-13.
33 Id. at 2313.
34 Id. at 2312.
3 Id. at 2313.
36 Id.
[Vol. 34:249
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tions involved in the issue of what is a security for purposes of the federal
securities laws. One question involves the issue of whom the federal
securities laws were intended to protect. A number of courts and
commentators had taken the position that the laws were not intended to
protect entrepreneurs and had extended this to include purchasers of a
controlling interest in a corporation who intend to manage the business. 37
Referring to the Howey test, they argue that any profit accruing to these
individuals is not "from the efforts of others".38 Others, however, have
questioned whether the entrepreneur-investor distinction is meaning-
ful. They have suggested, for example, that a person could be both an
investor and an entrepreneur.39
The Court has now clearly held that the Howey test does not apply to
corporate stock. Thus, entrepreneurs who purchase that instrument have
the protection of the federal securities laws, particularly the antifraud
provisions. The Court did not, however, state that the entrepreneur-
investor distinction was always irrelevant to security status. It is clear
that investor status will still be important for unusual instruments which
must fall within the catch-all phrases in the statutory definition if they
are to be a security. In these cases, the Howey test will remain applicable.
And under this test, the source of any expected profits is a crucial
element. 40
An accurate statement of the effect of the decisions is that entrepre-
neurs who purchase corporate stock are protected by the federal securi-
ties laws, but those who purchase instruments of an unusual nature
which are not traditionally "the paradigm of a security" are not protected.
" See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982)("We must ask in other words
what class of people Congress wanted to protect by enacting the Securities Exchange
Act.... The answer is not in doubt: investors").
38 See supra note 10.
a The court of appeals in Ruefenacht stated:
The distinction between an "entrepreneur" and an "investor" is hardly obvious.
Many investors may elect to participate in the management of a business in order
to enhance their return on investment; indeed, in our free enterprise system that
is to be expected.... It seems clear to us that these persons are both investors and
entrepreneurs.
Ruefenacht, 737 F.2d at 334. See also Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1146 (2nd Cir.
1982)(distinction is of dubious value; "purchasers of a business rightly regard themselves as
investors as well as managers.")
Even the Seventh Circuit, which was a champion of the sale-of-business doctrine, realized
that 'lilt is of course easy to imagine intermediate cases, where the distinction between a
purchase for investment and a purchase for control becomes fuzzy..." and, as a consequence,
adopted a presumption to aid in the search for the true purpose of a purchaser. See Sutter
v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (1982).
4 Thus a true franchise in which the franchisee's profits are in large part a function of
his or her own efforts will remain a nonsecurity. See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City
Steak, Inc. 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972); Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F.Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
1986]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The disparate treatment seems to be justified in the Court's mind by the
differing expectations of the entreprenuer in the two situations. The
buyer of corporate stock contemplates the protection of the laws; the
purchaser of unusual instruments does not.
Steven's dissent indicates a different attitude toward the entrepreneur
who purchases stock of a corporation with the intention of managing the
business. He would not extend the protection of the federal securities
laws to entrepreneurs who purchase stock which is not publically traded;
however, he would extend the protection to the entrepreneur who
purchases stock which is traded in a public market. Thus, under Steven's
approach, entrepreneurs who purchase either unusual instruments or
nonpublically traded stock would have no protection, but those who
purchase publically traded stock would.41
The distinction that Stevens finds between stock which is traded in a
public market and that which is not is derived from the purpose of the
federal securities laws. He views that purpose as the regulation of
transactions in securities which are traded in public markets.42 It is
interesting that his view of the purpose of the federal securities laws
seems to find support in the Court's decision in Marine Bank v. Weaver.
43
Weaver involved an agreement between the guarantors of a corporation's
loan and the owners of the corporation. Under the agreement, the
guarantors were to receive fifty percent of the corporation's net profit and
$100 per month for as long as they guaranteed the loan. In addition, they
were to be permitted the use of a corporate barn and pasture at the
discretion of the owners of the corporation, and were to have the right to
veto future borrowing by the corporation. 44 The Court held that this
unique agreement, negotiated on a face-to-face, one-on-one basis and not
designed to be publically traded, was not a security. 45
B. What Weight Should be Given to the Form of a Transaction?
A second issue is what weight should be given to the form of a
transaction. In several prior cases, the Supreme Court had held that the
economic realities and not the form of a transaction should determine the
41 105 S. Ct. at 2313.
42 Id. at 2312.
43 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
44 Id. at 553.
45 Id. at 559-60. The decision in Weauer and Stevens' dissent appear to be generally
consistent with the position taken in a recent article that securities are instruments which
are or are capable of being the subject of transactions in a financial market. See FitzGibbon,
What is a Security? - A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial
Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893 (1980). The article is cited in Weaver for the proposition that
the Securities Exchange Act "was adopted to restore investors' confidence in the financial
markets." 455 U.S. at 555 n.4.
[Vol. 34:249
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applicability of the federal securities laws.4 6 Many read these cases,
particularly Forman, to mean that the economic reality approach should
apply to corporate stock. 47 Thus, if the transaction was in effect a
purchase of assets with the intention of managing them, then the
securities laws should be inapplicable.
The majority, however, interpreted its prior cases as applying the
economic realities test only to "unusual instruments not easily charac-
terized as 'securities"'. It determined that, at least as to traditional stock,
it would adopt a literal approach: it is a security because it is specifically
enumerated in the statutory definition. The Court, however, was not
willing at this time to extend its literal approach beyond traditional
stock. It stated: "We here leave until another day the question whether
'notes' or 'bonds' or some other category of instrument listed in the
definition might be shown 'by proving [only] the document itself."'
48
The decisions, then, are not likely to be of great value to lower courts
in deciding what approach to adopt as to instruments other than
traditional stock. In point of fact, the majority opinions may give
conflicting signals to lower courts. On the one hand the Court states
"... applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other types of
instruments listed in the statutory definition would make the Acts'
enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous." 49 The Court
goes on, however, to "point out several reasons why we think stock may
be distinguishable from most if not all of the other categories listed in the
Acts' definition."5 0 It concludes that "[u]nlike some instruments, there-
fore, traditional stock is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach."1
If the Howey test is limited to the catch-all phrases, but some enumerated
instruments are not easily susceptible to a plain meaning or literal
approach, what approach should be used?
The literal approach of the Court to the language in the definitional
section is also somewhat surprising when viewed against the Weaver
decision. In that case the Court stated "[t]he broad statutory definition is
preceded, however, by the statement that the terms mentioned are not to
be considered securities if 'the context otherwise requires ... ' ,"'52 The
46 S.E.C_ v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946); and United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
17 See, e.g., Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Thompson, supra
note 4.
48 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306.
49 Id.
" Id. One reason given was that stock represents the "paradigm" of a security to many
persons. This is likely to give rise to an expectation that the securities acts apply. The
second reason was that stock is relatively easy to identify because its characteristics can be
defined. Id.
51 Id.
52 455 U.S. at 556.
1986]
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Court went on to hold that the certificate of deposit in question was not
a security because of the perceived existence of adequate protections
under the federal banking laws.
Prior to the Weaver decision, it was unclear whether the prefatory
language referred to statutory or factual context. Weaver clearly sug-
gested that the language permitted inquiry into the factual or economic
context of a transaction in determining whether a security exists.5 3 The
effect of the decisions in Landreth and R uefenacht, however, is to preclude
the examination of factual context when traditional stock is involved.
Unfortunately, the Court's refusal to indicate the extent to which it
would apply a literal approach to other instruments listed in the
statutory definition of a security limits the guidance provided by Weaver,
Landreth and R uefenacht to the specific factual contexts before the Court
in those cases.
C. How Important is a Clear and Predictable Definition?
A third issue is the relative value of a clear and predictable definition
of "security" as measured against the expansion of the scope of the federal
securities laws to evils which may be beyond those Congress intended to
correct. The majority, while asserting its decision "comports with Con-
gress' remedial purpose in enacting the legislation. . . ,,54 seems to put
greater emphasis on its conclusion that the sale-of-business doctrine
would in many cases create slippery factual questions which would
generate uncertainty as to the applicability of the federal securities laws.
This uncertainty would have at least two costs. One would be the
inability of the parties to a transaction to predict at the time of the
transaction whether the federal securities laws were applicable. The
other would be the demands placed on the federal courts which would
have to ultimately resolve the complex question of control. This would
often be possible only after extended discovery and litigation.55
The majority in effect adopted the approach of the Second Circuit. The
language of the Court sounds very much like that of the Second Circuit
in Golden v. Garafalo.56 In Golden the majority, in rejecting the sale-of-
" See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982)("The Court [in Weaver] got
around seemingly uncompromising language by treating the word 'context' . . . as having
reference to economic as well as linguistic context."); Banowitz v. The State Exchange
Bank, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,997 (N.D. Ill. 1985), at 90,949
(Weaver supports focus on context of transaction instead of on literal meaning of statutory
words); Thompson, supra note 4, at 251 ("The Supreme Court [in Weaver] appears to have
resolved the dispute in favor of the broader approach to 'context' and against the literal
approach.").
54 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2303.
5 See Id. at 2307-08; Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2310-11.
56 678 F.2d 1139 (2nd Cir. 1982).
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business doctrine, stated: "[T]he dangers of creating uncertainty as to the
scope of the Acts and in generating slippery legal and factual issues going
to jurisdiction are substantial." 57 The court conceded that the rejection of
the sale-of-business doctrine resulted "in a certain overbreadth in appli-
cation", but viewed this as the result of a conscious legislative choice.5
8
The Court also seems to have adopted the position of the Third Circuit
in Ruefenacht that the costs to the public must be considered in evaluat-
ing the sale-of-business doctrine.5 9 In rejecting the sale-of-business
doctrine the appellate court stated that under the doctrine:
Counsel must be hired to predict whether the purchase of a large
block of stock will render it a security or a non-security. Doubts
will be created over whether registrations are necessary. All of
this uncertainty has real economic costs .... That uncertainty
raises the cost of economic transactions, inhibits the flow of
capital, spawns litigation, and in general benefits neither the
parties or the courts.6
Justice Stevens, by comparison, was more troubled by the application
of the federal securities laws to transactions which he viewed as outside
of the scope of congressional concern. He did not feel that the values of
certainty and predictability were strong enough to justify the expansion
of the securities laws to transactions involving instruments not traded in
public markets.
Stevens adopts the position taken by the Seventh Circuit. In Sutter v.
Groen,61 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its adoption of the sale-of-
business doctrine stating:
The problem of drawing lines was the principal reason given by
the Second Circuit in Golden for rejecting the sale of business
doctrine.... We agree that the costs of administering legal rule
are a proper concern in designing those rules. But rarely will a
net savings in those costs be produced by expanding liability,
since even if the legal standard will be simpler and therefore
cheaper to apply in each case the number of potential cases in
which it will be applied will be greater. And if there were some
net savings we doubt they could justify expanding liability to
57 Id. at 1146.
58 Id. Cf. Dillport, Restoring Balance to the Definition of a Security, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 99,
121 (1982)("The orderly administration of the Acts will become unmanageable ... if the
status of an instrument as a security is determined on the basis of the transaction in which
it transferred.").
59 737 F.2d at 332.
60 Id. at 332-33.
61 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
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reach substantive evil far outside the scope of the legislature's
concern.
62
The majority's concern in Landreth and Ruefenacht that the definition
of "security" be certain and predictable seems somewhat out of step with
the Court's decision in Weaver, which placed great emphasis on the
context of a transaction. The decision in Weaver, fairly read, would seem
to encourage the case-by-case analysis that both Landreth and
R uefenacht reject. In Weaver, after deciding that the certificate of deposit
and the business agreement involved were not securities, the Court
stated in a footnote:
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business
agreement ... invariably falls outside the definition of a "secu-
rity" . . . . Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on
the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the
purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting as a
whole.63
One could argue that Stevens' dissent is more consistent with the
decision in Weaver.
D. When Should Need for Protection be a Factor?
A fourth issue is the extent to which need for protection should be a
factor in determining whether a security exists. The majority dealt with
this issue obliquely. It noted that traditional stock "'represents to many
people, both trained and untrained in business matters, the paradigm of
a security."' 64 The Court continued: "[P]ersons trading in traditional
stock likely have a high expectation that their activities are governed by
the Acts."6 5 The Court also posited that the uncertainty generated by the
62 Id. at 202. One judge, referring to the adoption of the sale-of-business in the Second
Circuit, has stated:
our district courts will soon be burdened with an escalating stream of cases
where purchasers of businesses have become disillusioned with bargains they
made.... Here the parties involved are relatively sophisticated businessmen who
contracted to purchase a business in order to control its operation themselves.
There is no good reason why federal courts should hear such cases and permit such
a totally unnecessary expansion of federal jurisdiction. To do so seems to disregard
all that we are constantly told by our brethren on the Supreme Court, and that we
ourselves know, about the overworked federal judicial system.
Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227, 230 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 104
S. Ct. 2231, appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 23 (1984).
63 455 US. at 560 n.ll.
64 Landreth, 105 S. Ct, at 2306, quoting Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir.
1983).
65 105 S. Ct. at 2306.
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sale-of-business doctrine does not permit "the purchaser to compensate
for the added risk of no protection when negotiating the transaction."66
The Court sought to protect the expectations of corporate stock pur-
chasers that the federal securities laws apply to the transaction because
these purchasers will rarely seek other protections.
Justice Stevens approaches in a more direct manner the question of
need for protection. He argues that a purchaser of stock which is not
publically traded should not be entitled to the protections of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws if he or she is in a position to
negotiate appropriate contractual warranties or insist on access to inside
information prior to consummating transaction. 67 Interestingly enough,
it appears that he would apply the antifraud provisions of such laws to
stocks which were not publically traded if the purchaser were not in a
position to so protect himself or herself. This is extremely difficult to
square with Stevens' view of the securities laws as intended to regulate
transactions in public markets. Stevens' willingness to apply the federal
securities laws in this situation may be based on the purchaser's need for
protection or on the investor as opposed to entrepreneurial status of the
purchaser. It is not entirely clear which of the two considerations is
predominant.
The Court's treatment of the issue of need for protection is interesting
for a number of reasons. First, the Court seems to find a need for
protection based on the expectation of a party that the securities laws
would be applicable. It would be legitimate to query, however, whether
such an expectation should be significant. One author has stated:
Even assuming that the buyer expects the securities laws to
apply to the sale of stock, it is unfair to bind the seller to these
expectations unless the buyer's expectations are reasonable. This,
in turn, depends on whether the transaction is one to which the
securities laws were intended to apply.68
Secondly, the Court's decision may be somewhat surprising in light of
its prior decisions. Lack of a need for the protections of the federal
securities laws seems to have been a factor in each of the Court's last
three decisions dealing with the question of whether a security existed. In
United Housing Foundation v. Forman69 the Court found that shares of
stock in a non-profit housing cooperative were not securities. In a footnote
66 Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2311.
67 105 S. Ct. at 2313.
" Ribstein, Securities Regulation, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1461, 1484 (1983). Ribstein
concludes that the sale of assets is not a securities transfer and that "[ilt is ... difficult to
understand why it should matter whether a transfer of all the assets of a business is
structured as a sale of 'assets' or of 'stock"'. Id. at 1484.
69 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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to the case the Court opined that the purchasers took "no risk in any
significant sense." As evidence, the Court noted the fact that the state
was financing the bulk of the construction costs and was regulating the
"development and operation of the project."70 In International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Daniel,71 the Court held that a compulsory,
noncontributory pension plan did not constitute a security. The Court
noted the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 as a factor supporting its decision. It stated:
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use
of terms of employee pension plans severly undercuts all argu-
ments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory,
compulsory pension plans. Congress believed that it was filling a
regulatory void when it enacted ERISA. . . .Not only is the
extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported
by the language and history of those Acts, but in light of ERISA
it serves no general purpose. 72
In Marine Bank v. Weaver73 the Court held that an insured certificate
of deposit issued by a federally regulated bank and a privately negotiated
agreement were not securities. As to the certificate of deposit, the Court
noted that it "was issued by a federally regulated bank which is subject
to the comprehensive set of regulations governing the bank industry."74
The Court also pointed out that "deposits [in federally regulated banks]
are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Since its
formation in 1933, nearly all depositors in failing banks insured by the
FDIC have received payment in full, even payment for the portions of
their deposits above the amount insured."75 The Court concluded: "It is
unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the
holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the
federal banking laws. '76 As to the privately negotiated agreement, the
Court noted, among other things, that "the provision that the Weavers
could veto future loans gave them a measure of control over the operation
of the slaughterhouse not characteristic of a security." 77 Presumably this
control over the operation of the business was significant because it
70 Id. at 857 n.24.
71 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
72 Id. at 569-70.
73 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
74 Id. at 558.
75 id.
76 Id. at 559.
77 Id. at 560.
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reduced the Weaver's need for the protections of the federal securities
laws. 78
The Supreme Court's rejection of the sale-of-business doctrine is
arguably inconsistent with its decision in Weaver. In fact, prior to
Landreth and Ruefenacht one author had suggested that "the Supreme
Court would decide that a one-on-one negotiated sale of a business
through a stock transfer is not a security" because of the existence of
other adequate protections in that situation. These were perceived to
include "(1) the presence of an attorney at the negotiations; (2) contrac-
tual warranties; and (3) state antifraud laws".79
It is possible that the Supreme Court's rejection of the sale-of-business
doctrine was an attempt to rectify an error it perceived in the Weaver
decision. The suggestion in Weaver that the Court would not apply the
federal securities laws to unusual, privately negotiated transactions was
criticized as "erroneously equat[ing] the registration provisions of the
federal securities laws with the anti-fraud provisions of those laws."so It
is interesting to note that in the Landreth opinion the Court expressly
states that: "although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act ... exempts involving any
public offering from the Act's registration provisions, there is no compa-
rable exemption from the antifraud provisions."S Perhaps, then, the
Court felt it made a mistake in Weaver and attempted to correct it in
Landreth.
E. Is a Security a Thing or a Transaction?
A final issue is whether something can be a security as to one person
and not as to another. The sale-of-business doctrine assumes that this is
the case. Some courts and commentators have found very troubling the
suggestion that something might be a security as to one person and not
as to another.8 2
7 Cf. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 396 (1967) ("The danger of fraud being practiced on the
buyer is considerably reduced when his initial investment is subjected to risks of an
enterprise with which he is familiar at the time of the transaction and over which he
exercises management control.") One can question whether the measure of control given by
the veto was substantial enough to provide significant protection. Compare Schultz v. Dain
Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978) (purchase of apartment complex and contemporaneous
management contract not a security; purchaser retained ultimate control over complex).
79 Darrell, Redefining a "Security": Is the Sale of a Business Through a Stock Transfer
Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 22, 57 (1984).
"o Bunch, Marine Bank v. Weaver: What is a Security?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1036
(1983). See also, BLOOMENrHAL 1982 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK xlix ("The Court confused the
issue of what constitutes a security and those securities which are exempt from registra-
tion.").
8' Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2305.
12 One author has written that "courts upholding the sale of business doctrine have
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The majority, while not stating that the identity or characteristics of
the parties is always irrelevant to security status, stated:
Application of the sale of business doctrine would also lead to
arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered by the Acts
and those that are not. Because applicability of the Acts would
depend on factors other than the type and characteristics of the
instrument involved, a corporation's stock could be determined to
be a security as to the seller, but not as to the purchaser, or as to
some purchasers but not others.... Such distinctions make little
sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect investors.
83
The Court's description of the possibility under the sale-of-business
doctrine that stock would be a security as to one person and not as to
another as being arbitrary and "depending on factors other than the type
and characteristics of the instrument involved" seems to evince a view
that a security is a thing and not a transaction. The Court suggests that
a thing must be a security as to all or as to none. It can't be a security as
to some.
Justice Stevens did not expressly address this issue. It seems clear,
however, that he would find the same interest could be a security as to
some but not as to others. He would hold that the federal securities laws
are inapplicable to a purchase of corporate stock that is not publically
traded unless the purchaser is an investor without the ability to negotiate
contractual protections or demand access to inside information. This
distinction between who is and who is not protected by the federal
securities laws is based on factors which may well be extrinsic to the
characteristics of the interest transferred.
If it is the view of the Court that something must be a security as to all
or as to none, then a number of lower court cases not involving the
sale-of-business doctrine, such as Williamson v. Tuckere4 and other
introduced a disconcerting asymmetry into securities transactions in that one party may be
dealing in a security while the other is not." Karjala, supra note 4, at 429. See also Darrell,
supra note 79, at 53 ("Shares of stock, unlike lizards, are not chameleons. Just as a leopard
cannot change its spots, an instrument cannot change its status as a security depending on
who holds it."). Compare Seldin, supra note 4, at 681 n. 107 ("strangeness of this result is
largely superficial").
In one recent case, a federal district court responded to the argument that a certificate of
deposit was a security as to a bank's auditors even if it was a nonsecurity as to the bank by
stating: "[The purchaser] may be able to allege that it purchased a car with no motor and
that the seller was a crook, but it cannot show that the car it purchased was 'in effect' a
bicycle." Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 577 F. Supp. 1281,
1286-87 (1983).
3 Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. at 2311.
84 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
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similar decisions, 85 are wrong. The court in Williamson, for example,
stated that an interest in a general partnership or joint venture could be
a security in a number of situations including where the "partner or
venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs
that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture
powers."8 6 It is clear that the court in Williamson would permit inquiry
into the characteristics of the purchaser of a general partnership interest
as well as the characteristics of the interest itself. A general partnership
interest sold to a sufficiently unsophisticated investor might be a secu-
rity; a similar interest sold to an experienced businessperson would not
be. The appropriateness of such an approach is in substantial doubt after
Landreth and R uefenacht, in spite of the fact that Weaver seems to
encourage examination of factual context.8
7
III. CONCLUSION
In evaluating the recent decisions in Landreth and Ruefenacht one
could ask two questions: (i) What do the decisions tell us? and (ii) What
questions are not answered by the decisions?
The decisions clearly answer the question of the validity of the
sale-of-business doctrine. It is not valid. Traditional common stock is a
security simply because it is stock. In a given case it would still be open
to a party to present evidence that the instrument involved was not stock.
" See, e.g., McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., [1983-4] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,538 (N.D. Cal.); Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
86 645 F.2d at 424.
87 On the other hand, is there a difference between corporate stock and investment
contracts so that while corporate stock is always a security, other instruments may be or
may not be investment contracts depending upon the characteristics of the holder? The
Fifth Circuit, which had rejected the sale-of-business doctrine, recently stated:
it is not necessary that an interest be deemed a security in the hands of both the
seller and the purchaser.
The characterization of an interest as a security or not can vary with the
relationship of its holder to the venture. If the interest takes the form of an
investment contract, Howey teaches that it is a security only if the holder is
relying on the managerial skills of others to generate his profit. By implication, if
the holder is relying on his own entrepreneurial talents to generate his profit, his
interest is not treated as a security because he does not fall within the class of
persons Congress meant to protect when it included non-traditional securities in
the coverage of the securities laws.
Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3515 (1984). But cf. the
opinion of Judge Garth in Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S Ct. 118 (1984). Judge Garth would hold as a matter of law that general partnership
interests are not securities because of the statutory rights and powers of a general partner-
Two judges concurred with him as to the court's judgment but not as to all of his analysis
of the case.
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This is permitted by the Forman decision. However, if the instrument has
the characteristics usually associated with common stock, there is no
longer room for argument as to the applicability of the federal securities
laws.
Unfortunately, however, while we now know that the Court will apply
the Howey test to investment contracts and a literal or plain meaning
approach to corporate stock, we do not know what approach it would
apply to other types of instruments which are enumerated in the
statutory definitions.
The decisions also indicate a concern on the Court's part that the
definition of a security be as clear as possible and that the applicability
of the federal securities laws be predictable at the time of a transaction.
The Court states candidly that "[i]t is fair to say that our cases have not
been entirely clear on the proper method of analysis for determining
whether an instrument is a 'security."' 88
The Court's concern that the definition of "security" be certain and
predictable is admirable. Many commentators have lamented the con-
tinuing confusion over the appropriate definition of this important
term.89 It would be fair to ask, however, whether the Landreth and
Ruefenacht cases clarify anything other than the appropriate treatment
of traditional stock. The narrow basis upon which the Court decided the
cases coupled with the apparent inconsistencies of the Court's approach
with prior decisions limit the guidance of the decisions to sales of
traditional stock. They are unlikely to be of much value in other contexts.
88 Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2303.
s See Karjala, supra note 4, at 437 ("Securities law affects thousands of transactions
every day .... The difficulties posed by unclear and unpredictable rules and case law need
not be elaborated."); Newton, What is a Security?: A Critical Analysis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167
(1977)("Over forty years after the adoption of the [federal securities acts], the controversy
surrounding what constitutes a security still rages .... [F]rom the pragmatic viewpoint of
counsel whose client proposes to raise funds by a public offering, this matter demands
clarity, not confusion.")
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